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 There are a number of situations in which it is impractical, expen-
sive, unethical, or methodologically deficient to study behavior in its 
natural context. Researchers are generally not allowed in the cockpit 
of an F-14 to study pilots’ decisionmaking, nor are they allowed to 
traumatize some participants (but not others) to determine whether 
highly stressful events might be repressed. The legal domain is no 
exception, as researchers are generally unable to assign decision-
makers (for example, judges and juries) to experimental conditions or 
observe their decisions as they naturally occur. Archival studies over-
come some of these limitations, but they present their own set of 
problems, such as selective sampling and irremediably confounded 
variables.1 The major recourse, as in other arenas of behavioral sci-
ence, is to conduct simulations.2 Analyses of the field of jury research 
                                                                                                                    
 * Brian H. Bornstein is Professor of Psychology and Courtesy Professor of Law at 
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He received his Ph.D. in 1991 from the University of 
Pennsylvania and Master of Legal Studies in 2001 from the University of Nebraska. His 
main research interests are jury decisionmaking and eyewitness testimony 
 ** Sean G. McCabe is currently in the J.D.-Ph.D. program at the University of Ne-
braska-Lincoln. He earned his B.Sc. in Neuroscience and Psychology from Dalhousie Uni-
versity in Halifax, Nova Scotia. His research interests include the social and cognitive fac-
tors that affect jury performance and damage awards.  
 Portions of this Article were presented at the International Interdisciplinary Conference 
on Psychology & Law, Edinburgh, Scotland (July 2003), and at the Symposium on the Be-
havioral Analysis of Legal Institutions: Possibilities, Limitations, and New Directions, Tal-
lahassee, Florida (March 2004). We are grateful for the comments of our fellow panelists at 
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 1. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict 
Statistics: Cautions About the Lorelei’s Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599 (1994). Vidmar 
also highlights the “apples and oranges” problem involved in comparing case types that dif-
fer on multiple dimensions as well as other issues that arise in relying on jury verdict re-
porters as the source of archival data. Id. at 605-06. 
 2. The pros and cons of simulation methodology generally have been treated else-
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suggest that experimental simulations have been increasing in re-
cent years.3 
 Simulated trials differ from real trials in a number of respects, 
such as the research setting and sample, as well as procedural and 
substantive verisimilitude. These limitations have been discussed ex-
tensively elsewhere.4 They can be overcome, to some extent, by using 
a relatively diverse sample instead of only college undergraduates 
and by using relatively realistic materials and judgment tasks.5 
However, one limitation seems insurmountable, as it is the sine qua 
non of a simulation; namely, no matter how realistic a simulation is, 
it is still just a simulation. Simulations can be quite realistic in cap-
turing the verisimilitude of their real-world analog in terms of the 
participant sample, the procedure, and other methodological charac-
                                                                                                                    
where. See, e.g., Elliot Aronson et al., Experimentation in Social Psychology, in 1 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 99 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); Ralph 
Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann, Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological 
Challenge for Psychologists?, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 383 (2001); David O. Sears, College 
Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data Base on Social Psychology’s 
View of Human Nature, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 515 (1986). 
 3. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First Century, 
12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (2002); Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury 
Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 86-87 (1999) [hereinafter 
Bornstein, Ecological Validity]; Michael T. Nietzel et al., Juries: The Current State of the 
Empirical Literature, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 23, 25-26 
(Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 1999). 
 4. See generally Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3; Robert M. Bray & Nor-
bert L. Kerr, Methodological Considerations in the Study of the Psychology of the Court-
room, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 287 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray 
eds., 1982) [hereinafter Bray & Kerr, Methodological Considerations]; Robert M. Bray & 
Norbert L. Kerr, Use of the Simulation Method in the Study of Jury Behavior: Some Meth-
odological Considerations, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107 (1979) [hereinafter Bray & Kerr, Use 
of Simulation]; James H. Davis et al., The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries: 
A Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES 326 (June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977); Shari Seidman Dia-
mond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 
(1997); Ronald C. Dillehay & Michael T. Nietzel, Constructing a Science of Jury Behavior, 
in 1 REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 246 (Ladd Wheeler ed., 1980); 
Kathleen Carrese Gerbasi et al., Justice Needs a New Blindfold: A Review of Mock Jury 
Research, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 323 (1977); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury 
Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 
(1993); Vladimir J. Konečni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in Legal 
Psychology, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1979); Vladimir J. Konečni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, 
Methodological Issues in Research on Legal Decision-Making, with Special Reference to Ex-
perimental Simulations, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 413 
(Friedrich Lösel et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Konečni & Ebbesen, Methodological Issues]; 
Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046 
(1989); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) 
Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Saks, Jury Experiments]; 
Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Para-
digm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1979). 
 5. It is worth noting, however, that these particular variables—the composition of 
the mock juror sample and realism of the mock trial—have little effect on the results of 
jury simulation research. See Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3, at 76-84. 
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teristics. Nonetheless, the essence of a simulation remains, which is 
that participants’ decisions lack real consequences.  
 Given that these consequences are absent, who would be affected 
by them if they were present? Most obviously, the litigants would be 
affected. Mock jurors reach a verdict concerning a paper defendant, 
who exists solely for purposes of the experiment; but real jurors 
make decisions concerning a flesh-and-blood defendant, which could 
entail a prison sentence or hefty damage award.6 Somewhat less ob-
viously, there are consequences for the jurors themselves. Mock ju-
rors volunteer to participate in a relatively short study, seldom last-
ing longer than a couple of hours, which they fit into their daily rou-
tine, and for which they are paid or receive course credit. Real jurors 
are summoned to appear at a designated time and place, without re-
gard to the needs and demands of their daily lives, to participate in a 
trial which might last for weeks, and for which they receive minimal 
compensation.  
 The purpose of this Article is to consider the ramifications of this 
distinction, which we refer to as the “consequentiality issue.” Part I 
elaborates on the principal questions raised by the issue. Part II pre-
sents the courts’ response to jury simulation research. Part III pre-
sents researchers’ response to the concerns about consequentiality 
and describes research findings on the issue, as well as the limita-
tions of that research. Part IV considers relevant research on related 
topics. The comment concludes in Part V with a discussion of possible 
alternatives to jury simulation research. 
I.   QUESTIONS ABOUT SIMULATIONS: IS THE ENTERPRISE ABSURD? 
 Despite the prevalence of simulation methodology in behavioral 
science research more broadly, not just regarding juries, its use has 
not gone unquestioned. As Kühberger et al. observed:  
It is a remarkable fact about decision research that the use of 
imagined situations is accepted as a legitimate means of studying 
real decision behavior. In other areas of psychology, such methods 
would be considered extremely questionable if not absurd. . . . 
Would any psychophysicist be taken seriously who investigated 
perceived heaviness not by giving participants actual weights to 
lift but by asking participants to imagine lifting a two pound 
weight?7 
                                                                                                                    
 6. This is not at all to suggest that mock jurors are cavalier in their approach. Like 
most jury researchers, we have continually been impressed by how seriously most mock ju-
rors take their task. Deliberations involving hypothetical parties can become quite heated. 
The question, though, is whether knowing in the back of one’s mind that there are ulti-
mately no real consequences for the parties involved can affect either the process or the 
outcome of mock jurors’ reasoning. 
 7. Anton Kühberger et al., Framing Decisions: Hypothetical and Real, 89 
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 Kühberger et al. point out that despite this apparent absurdity, 
all decisionmaking—even in real situations—is actually hypothetical: 
it involves weighing evidence to test hypotheses, considering events 
that may or may not obtain, and anticipating feelings we do not yet 
have.8 Even real jurors reason in this fashion; for example, if I accept 
as true what this witness says, how much does it increase or de-
crease the probability that the defendant is guilty?9 How would I feel 
if I vote to convict the defendant but he really is innocent? So ulti-
mately, in a sense, the disjunction is between thinking hypothetically 
about real cases and thinking hypothetically about hypothetical 
cases. The crucial distinction is whether the hypothesis-testing proc-
ess ends in consequences for the parties involved. 
 Should psycholegal researchers be concerned? The answer, not 
surprisingly, is that it depends. In particular, it depends primarily, 
perhaps exclusively, on whether real and simulated decisionmaking 
differ in either process or outcome. In terms of process, mock jurors, 
knowing their decisions lack real consequences, might take their task 
less seriously and therefore put forth less effort than real jurors. This 
could lead them to process the evidence less systematically or apply 
the law inappropriately, thereby denying defendants due process.10 
An abundance of research shows that when decisionmakers are “ac-
countable” for their decisions—that is, when they have to justify or 
defend them to others—their decisionmaking process is more ra-
tional and complex.11 Real jurors—who face the litigants in open 
court, answer to the judge, and can be polled afterwards by the at-
torneys—surely feel accountable; but it is unclear how accountable 
mock jurors, who are usually nondeliberating students earning extra 
course credit for completing a questionnaire describing hypothetical 
parties, would feel. 
                                                                                                                    
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1162, 1162 (2002). 
 8. Id. at 1163. 
 9. A number of theorists have explicitly framed jurors’ decisionmaking in such hy-
pothesis-testing terms, often invoking Bayes’ Theorem as a normative model for doing so. 
See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, David, Goliath, and Reverend Bayes: Prior Beliefs About De-
fendants’ Status in Personal Injury Cases, 8 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 233 (1994); 
Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy 
Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247 
(1990). 
 10. In support of this possibility, dual-process models of decisionmaking distinguish 
between “heuristic” and “systematic” processing. The former focuses more on superficial 
characteristics of the information and less on content, whereas the latter involves more 
cognitive effort and is more content-driven. See generally Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus 
Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persua-
sion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 752 (1980). For a legal application, see Bradley 
D. McAuliff et al., Juror Decision-Making in the Twenty-First Century: Confronting Science 
and Technology in Court, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS 303 (David 
Carson & Ray Bull eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
 11. See generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of 
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999). 
2005]                          JURORS OF THE ABSURD? 447 
 
 Regarding outcomes, they could differ in terms of a statistical 
main effect—for example, if there were more convictions in simulated 
than in real murder trials—or in terms of an interaction, as would be 
the case if some substantive or procedural variable exerted a greater 
effect in one situation than the other. For instance, pretrial publicity 
or expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness memory might 
exert a larger effect in simulated than real trials, or vice versa.12 As 
several commentators have noted, methodological variables that are 
involved in interactions are more problematic, though often more in-
teresting theoretically, than variables that exert main effects.13 
 The potential for differences between real and simulated jury de-
cisionmaking has both theoretical/psychological and legal/policy im-
plications. From a psychological-theory perspective, a failure to ob-
tain comparable findings in the two settings would compromise the 
simulation research’s external validity, which “refers to the extent to 
which a particular causal relationship is robust across populations or 
settings.”14 The ultimate goal of most psychological research is to dis-
cover general principles of behavior; therefore, the discovery of prin-
ciples that hold true only in limited domains—and artificially con-
trived ones, at that—has limited utility.15 
 Although it is true that most psychological research is guided by a 
quest for understanding general principles, a great deal of psychole-
gal research is conducted with the additional goal of using the find-
ings to improve functioning of the legal system.16 Hence the quality of 
the research has important legal implications as well, in the sense 
that courts and other policymaking bodies, such as legislatures, can 
rely on research findings in setting policies regarding jury issues. As 
discussed below, the courts are not always receptive to experimental 
research, due largely to these same concerns about external valid-
ity—that is, the extent to which the research findings have anything 
                                                                                                                    
 12. We have chosen these particular examples for purely illustrative purposes, though 
some suggestive evidence on the pretrial publicity question is provided by Geoffrey P. 
Kramer & Norbert L. Kerr, Laboratory Simulation and Bias in the Study of Juror Behav-
ior: A Methodological Note, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1989). Although they did not com-
pare jury decisions with and without consequences, they did find that pretrial publicity ef-
fects did not appear to differ as a function of the length and complexity of simulated trials. 
Id. at 96-98. 
 13. See, e.g., Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3, at 78; Bray & Kerr, Meth-
odological Considerations, supra note 4, at 309-13; Saks, Jury Experiments, supra note 4, 
at 8. 
 14. Aronson et al., supra note 2, at 130. 
 15. Id. See generally Diamond, supra note 4 (discussing examples of limited useful-
ness of certain simulations). 
 16. Professor Michael Saks has clearly articulated the relationship between empirical 
research and legal policy decisions. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About 
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992); 
Saks, Jury Experiments, supra note 4; Michael J. Saks, Legal Policy Analysis and Evalua-
tion, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1110 (1989). 
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substantial to say about actual legal contexts. It is, therefore, to the 
field’s credit that the experimental methodologies used by research-
ers are becoming increasingly sophisticated and legally realistic.17 
Nonetheless, an experiment is ultimately still an experiment, raising 
the issue of whether any simulation can meaningfully speak to real-
world legal questions. 
II.   THE COURTS’ RESPONSE TO SIMULATION 
 Trial and appellate courts have been presented with social scien-
tific research at least as far back as the famous “Brandeis brief” in 
Muller v. Oregon,18 and considerable evidence suggests that the trend 
is increasing.19 Such research has been presented in a number of con-
texts, ranging from desegregation and punitive damages to affirma-
tive action, eyewitness identification, capital punishment, and count-
less others.20 On the whole, courts have been reluctant to base their 
decisions on social scientific data,21 though there are, of course, ex-
ceptions.22 The courts’ response to psychological research pertaining 
to capital cases (for example, death qualification and instruction 
comprehension) is perhaps the most prominent example of judges’ re-
luctance to rely on experimental simulations.23 In many cases, courts 
                                                                                                                    
 17. See Diamond, supra note 4; Nietzel et al., supra note 3, at 23-24; William C. 
Thompson, Research on Jury Decision Making: The State of the Science, in INDIVIDUAL AND 
GROUP DECISION MAKING: CURRENT ISSUES 203 (N. John Castellan, Jr. ed., 1993). 
 18. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 19. For a brief history of social science in the law, see generally MARK COSTANZO, 
PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO LAW 1-30 (2004); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-29 (4th ed. 1998); Blumenthal, supra note 3; 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Julius G. Getman, Social Science in Legal Decision-Making, in LAW 
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 581 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986); and Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth & Robert Mauro, Psychology and Law, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 2, at 684.  
 20. A comprehensive listing of cases involving social scientific data is beyond the 
scope of the present Article. For representative cases, see the following: Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244, 298-300 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (regarding affirmative action); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (regarding benefits of affirmative action); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (regarding punitive dam-
ages; although the Court’s decision did not cite social scientific research, jury researchers 
submitted amici curiae on behalf of both plaintiff and defendant); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 
U.S. 162, 168-71 (1986) (regarding capital punishment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 494 n.11 (1954) (regarding desegregation); United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 
1023-24 (7th Cir. 1989) (regarding eyewitness identification). For general reviews, see 
Blumenthal, supra note 3; MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 19; and Mark I. Satin, Law 
and Psychology: A Movement Whose Time Has Come, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 581, 600-02. 
 21. See, e.g., MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 19; J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of 
a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 138 
(1990) (indicating that the Supreme Court has not welcomed research on jury behavior). 
 22. See Diamond, supra note 4, at 569; Tanford, supra note 21, at 138. 
 23. See, e.g., James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical 
Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 65 (1993); Diamond, supra note 4, at 567-69; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleasant 
Facts: The Supreme Court’s Response to Empirical Research on Capital Punishment, in 
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reviewing death sentences have discounted experimental social sci-
entific findings due to various perceived methodological shortcomings 
of the research;24 yet in a number of cases, one of the supposed short-
comings was the simulated nature of the research itself. 
 For example, in Free v. Peters the Seventh Circuit considered the 
results of a jury simulation that assessed mock jurors’ comprehen-
sion of death penalty instructions.25 Among other shortcomings of the 
study, the court opined that “[t]he first [fatal flaw] is lack of compa-
rability between the test setting and the setting of the sentencing 
hearing.”26 In other words, participants in the test setting were defi-
cient because they did not set real sentences. The Missouri Supreme 
Court reached a similar conclusion in another capital case, State v. 
Deck.27 The court rejected experimental data showing that penalty 
phase instructions were poorly understood, concluding:  
[The] study, however, must be discounted because the people in-
terviewed for the study did not act as jurors. They were given hy-
pothetical facts that were different than the facts in this case, and 
they did not hear the testimony of witnesses, observe physical evi-
dence or deliberate with eleven other jurors.28 
 The capital case that has received the most commentary in this 
respect is Lockhart v. McCree, in which Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, harshly criticized several 
jury simulations that purported to show that death-qualified juries 
were conviction-prone.29 Among other failings (for example, lack of 
deliberation), the Court identified the lack of consequences flowing 
from the decision as a major factor undermining the studies’ implica-
                                                                                                                    
CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES (Ken-
neth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988); Tanford, supra note 21, at 144-48; cf. 
Konečni & Ebbesen, Methodological Issues, supra note 4, at 416-18 (criticizing the 
California Supreme Court’s openness toward death-qualification voir dire simulations 
in true capital-case context and approving of the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
the research in that area should not be relied upon). 
 24. See generally sources cited supra note 23. This reluctance to adjudicate based 
on experimental evidence applies not merely to social scientific research, but to ex-
perimental data more broadly. Such evidence is often criticized as being too abstract 
and impersonal to bear on particular case facts, despite its relevance in a technical 
sense. E.g., In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985). More generally, it reflects a preference for case-specific information 
over aggregate data. See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, The Impact of Different Types of 
Expert Scientific Testimony on Mock Jurors’ Liability Verdicts, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & 
L. 429 (2004). A consideration of other types of experimental data is beyond the scope 
of the present Article; the focus here is on social/cognitive psychological experimenta-
tion. 
 25. 12 F.3d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 994 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1999). 
 28. Id. at 542. 
 29. 476 U.S. 162, 168-73 (1986). There is sizable literature critiquing the Court’s 
reasoning in Lockhart. See sources cited supra note 20. 
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tions: “[I]ndividuals . . . were not actual jurors sworn under oath to 
apply the law to the facts of an actual case involving the fate of an 
actual capital defendant.”30  
 These selected cases should not be taken to imply that the courts 
are invariably hostile to simulation research. Some courts, in a vari-
ety of cases, have been quite receptive to simulation research.31 
Nonetheless, the cases discussed in the preceding paragraphs are a 
fair representation of appellate courts’ general reluctance to base de-
cisions on simulation research, particularly on grounds of external 
validity. 
III.   RESEARCHERS’ RESPONSE TO THE CONSEQUENTIALITY QUESTION 
 For the most part, researchers have turned a blind eye to the 
consequentiality issue, within both psychology in general and psy-
cholegal research in particular.32 It has been alluded to in critiques of 
jury research, but overlooked in favor of more researchable problems, 
such as who the mock jurors are or characteristics of the mock trial.33 
These studies—which tend to find few differences as a function of 
simulations’ methodological characteristics—have focused on the 
quality of simulations, rather than simulations qua simulations.34 A 
large part of the reason for this avoidance of the consequentiality is-
sue is, no doubt, the fact that it is a notoriously intractable research 
question. A variety of research approaches exist, each with signifi-
cant limitations. 
A.   Possible Research Approaches 
 There are essentially three possible research approaches, each 
fraught with logistical or ethical complications. First, one could 
lead mock jurors to believe their decisions have consequences in 
situations where they really have no consequences. Although such 
a procedure raises the ethical issue of deception, it does not exceed 
the degree of deception that is commonplace, and generally ethi-
                                                                                                                    
 30. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added). 
 31. As Diamond points out, “[I]n a post-Daubert world, [courts] are paying more 
attention to scientific evidence of all kinds.” Diamond, supra note 4, at 569 (citation 
omitted). 
 32. In making this assertion, the authors do not exempt themselves and have 
even defended simulation methodology elsewhere. See, e.g., Bornstein, Ecological Va-
lidity, supra note 3. There are also several notable exceptions. See generally Aronson 
et al., supra note 2; Sears, supra note 2. Among jury researchers, Professor Shari 
Diamond has perhaps paid the greatest attention to the consequentiality issue. See 
Diamond, supra note 4; see also Weiten & Diamond, supra note 4. 
 33. See, e.g., Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3; Nietzel et al., supra 
note 3. 
 34. See sources cited supra note 33. 
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cally acceptable, in social psychological research.35 However, as a 
practical matter, it is difficult to convince research participants—
who are often fairly savvy psychology undergraduates—that the 
research means what the experimenter says it means. It would be 
especially difficult to persuade participants in a psychology re-
search laboratory that they are making decisions about a defen-
dant who is merely shown on videotape or described in a written 
summary, which are the most commonly used simulation media.36 
For this sort of dissimulation to have even a chance of success, the 
trial would need to be conducted live in an actual courthouse, or it 
would need to involve a dispute resolution context where it was 
plausible that undergraduates in a laboratory setting would be 
making real decisions. The former approach is difficult, time-
consuming, and expensive; the latter approach, though attempted 
with some success in the studies described below, is also quite 
complicated and strains participants’ credulity. 
 Second, one could lead real jurors to believe their decisions do 
not have consequences in situations where they really do. It is 
hard to imagine a judge who would condone leading some jurors to 
believe they were making mere hypothetical decisions, for the 
sake of comparison to other jurors who believed they were making 
consequential decisions, only to implement those decisions after 
the fact in both conditions. Such a procedure would adequately 
address the research question, and it would be fairly easy to im-
plement experimentally; but it is so blatantly unethical and unjust 
that it hardly warrants serious consideration.37 
 Third, one could randomly, or quasi-randomly, assign partici-
pants to conditions that differ solely in their consequences: really 
real versus really hypothetical. For example, one group of par-
ticipants would review a set of case facts under simulation as-
sumptions, while another group would review the same case facts 
but make a consequential decision.38 This approach is expensive 
                                                                                                                    
 35. See Aronson et al., supra note 2, at 135-37. For the American Psychological 
Association’s guidelines regarding deception, see AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, Ethical Standard 8.07, reprinted in 
57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1060, 1070 (2002), available at http://www.psycinfo.com/psycarticles 
/2002-11464-006.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 36. Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3, at 86. 
 37. It is also quite possibly illegal. With very few exceptions (for example, the oc-
casional investigative TV journalism report), jurors cannot be observed while perform-
ing their task. Because of fair-trial concerns, experimental manipulations involving 
juries are quite rare, and those that have been tried involve much less controversial 
procedures. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. A manipulation that varies 
the whole essence of the jury’s task, though intriguing from a scientific perspective, 
could never be implemented. 
 38. A study by Shari Diamond and Hans Zeisel that compared the decisions of ac-
tual and shadow juries comes closest to this sort of comparison. See Shari Seidman 
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and time-consuming, as it involves having the hypothetical deci-
sionmakers sit through an entire trial, so that their experience is 
the same as the real decisionmakers except for the consequences 
of their decision. And even so, it is difficult to match their ex-
periences completely: real jurors interact with each other, and 
with courtroom personnel (lawyers and the judge), in ways that 
shadow jurors would not. Finally, because the deliberations of 
real jurors are ordinarily off-limits to researchers, as noted 
above, one could compare the two groups on outcome but not on 
process.   
B.   Research Findings on the Consequentiality Question 
 Perhaps because of these myriad difficulties in conducting the 
research, we could find only five jury simulation studies that con-
ducted a direct test of the consequentiality question (see Table 1, 
infra).39 Most of these studies were conducted during the mid to 
late 1970s, which qualifies as the “heyday” of consequentiality re-
search. It is indeed odd that more recent research has not been 
conducted, as the question was hardly resolved by this small 
flurry of activity twenty to thirty years ago. Unfortunately, these 
studies provide no consensus about the effects of consequentiality 
on jurors’ decisions. One study found that convictions were less 
likely when the decision had real consequences,40 one study found 
that convictions were more likely when the decision had real con-
sequences,41 one study found no difference between real and hypo-
thetical decisions,42 and the two remaining studies found no main 
effect of consequentiality but obtained interacting effects with 
other variables.43  
 
 
                                                                                                                    
Diamond & Hans Zeisel, A Courtroom Experiment on Juror Selection and Decision-
Making, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 276 (1974). This study is described in 
more detail in Part III.B. 
 39. In chronological order, the studies were conducted by Diamond & Zeisel, 
supra note 38; David W. Wilson & Edward Donnerstein, Guilty or Not Guilty? A 
Look at the “Simulated” Jury Paradigm, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 175 (1977); 
Norbert L. Kerr et al., Role Playing and the Study of Jury Behavior, 7 SOC. 
METHODS & RES. 337 (1979); David Suggs & John J. Berman, Factors Affecting 
Testimony About Mitigating Circumstances and the Fixing of Punishment, 3 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 251 (1979); and Martin F. Kaplan & Sharon Krupa, Severe Penal-
ties Under the Control of Others Can Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 LAW & PSYCHOL. 
REV. 1 (1986). 
 40. Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 38, at 276-77. 
 41. Wilson & Donnerstein, supra note 39, at 185. 
 42. Kerr et al., supra note 39, at 348. 
 43. Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 39, at 8-13; Suggs & Berman, supra note 39, at 
256. 
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TABLE 1 
STUDIES MEASURING THE EFFECT OF CONSEQUENTIALITY ON 
JUROR/JURY DECISIONS 
STUDY SETTING MAIN EFFECT OF CONSEQUENTIALITY 
INTERACTING 
EFFECTS DELIBERATION 
 
Diamond & 
Zeisel 
(1974) 
 
Field 
 
More guilty verdicts 
for mock juries than 
real juries 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Wilson & 
Donner-
stein (1977) 
 
Laboratory 
 
More guilty verdicts 
for “real” jurors than 
hypothetical jurors 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Kerr et al. 
(1979) 
 
Laboratory 
 
No main effect of 
consequentiality 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Suggs & 
Berman 
(1979) 
 
Laboratory 
 
No main effect of 
consequentiality 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Kaplan & 
Krupa 
(1986) 
 
Laboratory 
 
No main effect of 
consequentiality 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 An early field study by Shari Diamond and Hans Zeisel looked 
specifically at differences between the verdicts of real and experi-
mental juries.44 In an experiment designed to examine the effect of 
peremptory challenges during voir dire on jury composition and ver-
dict, they arranged for three separate juries, one actual and two ex-
perimental, to hear one of ten criminal cases in the Northern District 
of Illinois.45 The first experimental jury, the “English jury,” consisted 
of a random sample of jurors from the pool who were not selected or 
questioned by the attorneys.46 A second experimental jury, the “chal-
lenged jury,” was made up of those jurors who were removed after 
peremptory challenges by either the prosecution or defense;47 these 
jurors did not know which side had excused them, as all challenges 
were submitted on special forms.48 All the jurors were treated simi-
                                                                                                                    
 44. Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 38, at 276. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
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larly during the trials; they were present in the courtroom during the 
entire trial, they were paid the standard juror fee, and they all delib-
erated in separate rooms before reaching a verdict.49 However, the 
real jurors knew that they were deciding on an actual verdict, 
whereas the experimental jurors knew that their decisions would 
have no effect on the defendant.50  
 Over the series of ten trials, the results revealed a tendency to-
ward more convictions for the experimental juries than for the real 
juries.51 This suggests that jurors on the real juries may have used a 
higher standard for conviction than experimental juries who knew 
that their decisions would have no consequences for the defendants. 
While this early study has been critiqued for a number of reasons,52 it 
still suggests that important variables to consider in mock-jury re-
search are the role-playing ability of experimental jurors and 
whether simulations can adequately represent the same decision-
making processes of real jurors. 
 While the results of the Diamond and Zeisel experiment suggested 
a trend toward more guilty verdicts by jurors who were aware of the 
experimental nature of their task, a later study produced results in-
dicating the opposite.53 To test the effect of consequentiality, Wilson 
and Donnerstein designed a series of studies in which a student was 
accused of stealing an exam and distributing the questions.54 The 
student was tried in the context of a student judicial hearing.55 The 
researchers manipulated the character and physical attractiveness of 
the defendant,56 but more importantly, participants were informed 
either that they were taking part in an experimental trial or that the 
trial was real and would have actual consequences for the student.57 
The results showed that jurors in the real-consequences condition ar-
rived at significantly more guilty verdicts than those in the hypo-
thetical-consequences condition.58 In addtion, jurors who thought 
they were participating in an actual trial recalled more of the trial 
evidence,59 which suggests that consequentiality can affect the deci-
sionmaking process as well as the outcome.  
 Kaplan and Krupa’s results also suggested higher conviction rates 
when participants believed they were participating in a real trial, but 
                                                                                                                    
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. See Bray & Kerr, Use of Simulation, supra note 4; Kerr et al., supra note 39. 
 53. Wilson & Donnerstein, supra note 39, at 185. 
 54. Id. at 179. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 174, 182, 184.  
 57. Id. at 179.  
 58. Id. at 185.  
 59. Id. at 186.  
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only under some circumstances.60 They were primarily interested in 
how the severity of the penalty would affect jurors’ decision to con-
vict, as well as how penalty severity might interact with the reality 
of the consequences. The authors reasoned that because the severity 
of the criminal convictions in the Diamond and Zeisel study was 
high, in comparison to the less severe consequences of stealing an 
exam in the Wilson and Donnerstein study, the severity of the case 
might determine the effects of consequentiality.61 To test this hy-
pothesis, Kaplan and Krupa designed an experiment where students 
were asked to judge the guilt of a fellow student who was accused of 
cheating.62 The independent variables were the following: the 
strength of evidence against the defendant;63 whether the jurors 
themselves or an authority would select the punishment; the possible 
penalty for conviction, which ranged from mild to moderate or from 
moderate to severe; and whether students were led to believe that 
their decisions were real and binding or part of an experimental 
simulation.64  
 There was a main effect for strength of evidence, such that when 
there was strong evidence of guilt, jurors were more likely to convict, 
without any interacting effects with the other variables.65 However, 
when the evidence of guilt was low and the punishment was con-
trolled by the students, the researchers found that those who were 
led to believe their decisions had real consequences were more likely 
to convict than those who made hypothetical decisions.66 Kaplan and 
Krupa suggested that these results may have differed from Diamond 
and Zeisel’s results because, in the present study, the jurors were 
judging other students in a case they had direct personal involve-
ment with: cheating on an exam they had all taken.67 The students 
might have adopted a lower conviction criterion and a stronger pre-
sumption of guilt when there was a chance someone could have got-
ten away with not writing the exam they all had to write.  
 While the research by Kaplan and Krupa suggests a possible ex-
planation for the different results between the Diamond and Zeisel 
and the Wilson and Donnerstein studies, two other studies that 
investigated consequentiality found yet other constellations of 
                                                                                                                    
 60. Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 39, at 8-13. 
 61. Id. at 2.  
 62. Id. at 3-4.  
 63. Id. at 3. The authors reasoned that when evidence points more clearly to guilt, it 
should be more difficult to deny the guilt of the defendant merely because a conviction en-
tails severe consequences. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 11.  
 66. Id. This result was obtained regardless of the level of punishment. Id. at 12. 
 67. Id. at 13.  
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results.68 Kerr et al. also examined the effect of role-playing on juror 
verdicts by comparing the responses of “actual” and “hypothetical” 
juries in an experimental student discipline case.69 The researchers 
created a hypothetical case involving a student charged with “mali-
cious destruction of University property” at a nearby campus who, 
because of tremendous publicity, had been granted a change of 
venue.70 Participants in the “actual jury” were led to believe that 
the school was experimenting with a new method of student disci-
pline and that they would receive course credit for their participa-
tion in the student’s trial.71 To boost the trial’s realism, a confeder-
ate, posing as a participant, was excused from the trial after indi-
cating she was at the other campus in the past year and had read 
about the case in the school newspaper.72 Another confederate, 
dressed in coat and tie, had been introduced as the cochairman of 
the University Committee on Student Discipline and reminded the 
students of the importance of their task.73 Participants in the “mock 
jury” were to place themselves in the role of jurors and decide a 
previously tried case that would have no actual consequences.74 All 
participants were given transcripts of the case and completed ques-
tionnaires both prior to and following deliberation.75 
 Results of the study suggested that there were no significant dif-
ferences between individual and group verdicts of the two juries.76 
There was also a failure to find differences for sentence recommenda-
tion, deliberation time, and reasonable doubt criterion.77 As well, 
prior to deliberation both groups indicated that they clearly under-
stood their roles and the importance of their decision for the defen-
dant.78 The authors argued that these results should increase our 
confidence that mock juries can reliably be utilized in jury behavior 
research.79 
 Finally, a study by Suggs and Berman provided mixed support for 
the use of mock juries.80 In an experiment designed to investigate the 
effect of mitigating testimony on mock-juror decisions, the research-
ers included a real-world consequentiality variable to enrich the ex-
                                                                                                                    
 68. See Kerr et al., supra note 39; Suggs & Berman, supra note 39.  
 69. Kerr et al., supra note 39, at 341-42, 345. 
 70. Id. at 342-43.  
 71. Id. at 342.  
 72. Id. at 343-44.  
 73. Id. at 343.  
 74. Id. at 345.  
 75. Id. at 344-45.  
 76. See id. at 347-48.  
 77. See id.  
 78. Id. at 347.  
 79. Id. at 351.  
 80. See Suggs & Berman, supra note 39. 
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ternal validity of the results.81 Participants in the “no-consequence” 
condition were informed that they were being given a hypothetical 
plagiarism case in order to investigate student attitudes toward 
cheating.82 Those in the “some-consequence” condition were told that 
the department chair had been confronted with a plagiarism case 
and wanted student input about appropriate action.83 Additionally, 
they were informed that while their opinions would be carefully con-
sidered, there was no guarantee that they would be the deciding fac-
tor in the case.84 The researchers also manipulated the presence of 
mitigating testimony, its source (defendant or third party), and its 
credibility (high versus low).85  
 Overall, there was no difference between participants in the no- 
and some-consequence conditions in their assignment of penalties. 
However, the pattern of results for the other variables was affected 
by consequentiality. When participants believed their decisions 
might have some consequence, less severe penalties were given when 
mitigating testimony for the defendant was presented (regardless of 
its source) than when it was not.86 However, for participants whose 
decisions had no consequence, none of the other variables produced 
any reliable difference.87 The researchers concluded that fears about 
the differences between real-world and role-playing behaviors among 
jurors may be well founded.88 
C.   Limitations of the Extant Studies 
 The results of the above studies provide little general consensus 
about the effect of role-playing and consequences on jury behavior. 
While a few studies provide support for those who criticize the exter-
nal validity of experimental jury simulations, the studies themselves 
fall victim to methodological criticisms. First of all, it is important for 
any study investigating the effect of role-playing on juror behavior to 
manipulate the consequentiality variable successfully and be certain 
participants believe the cover story. If participants who are led to be-
lieve they are hearing an actual trial have doubts about its reality or 
the consequences their decisions will have on the defendant, then it 
makes little sense to liken their behavior to that of real jurors. In the 
study by Wilson and Donnerstein, the students participated in the 
study to receive extra credit in a psychology course.89 Critics of this 
                                                                                                                    
 81. Id. at 254-55.  
 82. Id. at 255.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 254-55.  
 86. Id. at 258.  
 87. Id. at 258-59.  
 88. Id. at 260.  
 89. Wilson & Donnerstein, supra note 39, at 178.  
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study note that it seems quite likely that the “real” jurors, expecting 
to participate in a psychological experiment, would doubt the reality 
of their task.90 Unfortunately, Wilson and Donnerstein reported no 
data measuring the effectiveness of their cover story.91  
 Following the verdict responses of their participants, Kaplan and 
Krupa asked for their comments, concerns, or feelings about the pro-
cedure in order to assess its credibility.92 Only three participants 
showed an awareness of the deception and were eliminated from the 
sample.93 However, the authors failed to state exactly how these re-
sponses were elicited. If participants were indeed just asked to write 
any general “comments, concerns, or feelings” rather than asked spe-
cifically about the importance of the trial’s consequences, it might be 
that not all instances where the cover story failed were identified.  
 Suggs and Berman did explicitly measure the effectiveness of 
their consequentiality manipulation for participants in the some-
consequence condition, but they did not find particularly satisfying 
results. These participants were specifically asked if they doubted 
that the case was real; 30% answered that they had no doubt, 53% 
reported some doubt, 15% reported strong doubt, and 1% were con-
vinced it was not a real case.94 The participants were also asked 
whether they had doubts that their opinions would have any impact 
on the final decision, and 64% said yes.95 Again, students volunteered 
for the study in order to fulfill course requirements, which may have 
tipped them off as to the simulated nature of the case.  
 Noting the importance of the consequentiality manipulation, Kerr 
et al. sought to manipulate it effectively by creating a mock trial that 
was as realistic as possible.96 All participants were recruited to par-
ticipate in a vaguely worded “Jury project.”97 Because the student 
participants expected to receive course credit for their participation, 
the researchers assumed that most would expect the jury project to 
be some sort of experiment.98 For this reason, they used confederates 
and other props to enhance the credibility of the cover story.99  
 Kerr et al. also checked for participant suspicion of the experi-
mental manipulation. Of 108 “actual” jurors, seven indicated some 
misunderstanding or suspiciousness of the cover story in their writ-
                                                                                                                    
 90. Bray & Kerr, Use of Simulation, supra note 4, at 113; Kerr et al., supra note 39, at 
339. 
 91. See Wilson & Donnerstein, supra note 39.  
 92. Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 39, at 7.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Suggs & Berman, supra note 39, at 256.  
 95. Id.  
 96. See Kerr et al., supra note 39.  
 97. Id. at 341.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
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ten remarks, but they also indicated that they treated the case as 
genuine in case their suspicions were without merit.100 Also, prede-
liberation questionnaires indicated that actual jurors clearly believed 
their verdicts would have consequences for the defendant and felt 
that their decisions were significantly more important for the defen-
dant than did the mock jurors.101  
 Another limitation of these studies is that only two of the five in-
cluded jury deliberations, an extremely important part of the adver-
sarial process. A lack of jury deliberation in experimental studies has 
been identified as one of the major threats to external validity and 
policy relevance.102 Despite the frequent suggestion that jury verdicts 
are essentially determined by the distribution of verdict preferences 
prior to deliberation,103 there is reason to believe that deliberation 
can influence jury outcomes in certain situations. A recent meta-
analysis of research that investigated deliberating juries between 
1955 and 1999 argues that in one out of ten trials, deliberation re-
sults in a reversal of the verdict preference initially favored by the 
majority;104 given the large number of jury trials each year, a sub-
stantial number of trial outcomes could therefore hinge on the delib-
eration process. Other than the field experiment by Diamond and 
Zeisel, the only laboratory study of consequentiality that included de-
liberation was the study by Kerr et al.; but even then, the delibera-
tions were limited to forty-five minutes.105 With unlimited time, dis-
senting members of hung mock juries might be more willing to ac-
quiesce than those in the “actual” juries, due to the differential im-
portance of reaching a final decision in the two conditions.106  
 Because of the difficulties associated with trying to manipulate 
experimentally mock jurors’ perceptions of the consequences of their 
decisions, a more effective method might be to eliminate the conse-
quentiality manipulation and use shadow juries during actual trials, 
as was done by Diamond and Zeisel.107 However, this field method is 
not without its own limitations. The small number of cases and lack 
of experimental control over potentially confounding variables, such 
                                                                                                                    
 100. Id. at 346.  
 101. Id. at 347.  
 102. E.g., Diamond, supra note 4, at 564-65; Weiten & Diamond, supra note 4, at 78-
79. 
 103. E.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 169-71 (1983); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & 
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
 104. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on 
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622 (2001). Factors suggested by the 
meta-analysis for how deliberation may affect the verdict outcome include the deliberation 
style (evidence or verdict-driven), polling methods, and the collectively accepted interpreta-
tion of instructions.  
 105. Kerr et al., supra note 39, at 344.  
 106. Bray & Kerr, Use of Simulation, supra note 4, at 114. 
 107. Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 38, at 276. 
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as the juror selection procedure, make the results of the Diamond 
and Zeisel study difficult to assess as well.108   
 Finally, all of these studies involved criminal or quasi-criminal of-
fenses. Consequentiality might have different effects in civil trials, 
where the outcomes usually involve monetary damages instead of 
criminal sanctions, such as imprisonment or other penalties (for ex-
ample, failing a class or expulsion in the student honor-code-violation 
cases), and where a unanimous decision rule is less common.  
IV.   OTHER RELEVANT RESEARCH 
 An inspection of these studies leaves unresolved the question 
whether mock jurors behave similarly to actual jurors when they are 
aware that their decisions have no real consequences. In addition, 
the amount of deception necessary for effective consequentiality ma-
nipulations makes it very difficult to perform research on the conse-
quentiality of jury decisions. Because of these inconsistencies and 
limitations, it is helpful to review other bodies of research to see if 
results from analogous experiments can be used either to support or 
undermine the use of mock trials in studying juror behavior. Rele-
vant research exists within the jury research domain as well as from 
research on decisionmaking in nonlegal contexts. 
A.   Within the Legal/Jury Domain 
 As mentioned in Part III, Kaplan and Krupa suggested that it is 
important to include considerations of penalty severity when investi-
gating consequentiality.109 Intuitively, this makes sense: if we are 
considering the consequences that a jury’s decisions (that is, some 
versus none) will have on a defendant, then the magnitude of those 
consequences (small versus large) might be expected to operate in an 
analogous fashion.  
 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of willingness to convict 
in death penalty cases in Witherspoon v. Illinois110 and later in Lock-
hart v. McCree,111 indicating the Court’s concern with the impact of 
penalty severity on jurors’ decisions. If jurors are assumed to focus 
on avoiding false convictions of innocent people, then the greater the 
penalty severity, the greater the perceived cost of error. As this per-
ceived cost of error increases, jurors should require more evidence of 
guilt before voting to convict. With this shift in criterion, jurors 
                                                                                                                    
 108. Bray & Kerr, Use of Simulation, supra note 4, at 113; Kerr et al., supra note 39, at 
338. 
 109. Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 39. 
 110. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
 111. 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
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should therefore be less likely to vote guilty when the penalty is more 
severe.112 
 The idea that more severe penalties lead to less willingness to 
convict is not new to the experimental arena. For example, an early 
study by Vidmar found that when mock jurors were presented with 
several different guilt decision alternatives (each carrying a manda-
tory sentence), the highest number of not-guilty verdicts came from 
the condition with only two extreme alternatives (not guilty or first 
degree murder) as opposed to conditions with several or less extreme 
levels of guilt.113 Similar studies varying the latitude and severity of 
possible sentences offered to mock jurors have also found evidence 
suggesting that larger potential penalties lead to fewer convictions.114 
However, Freedman and his colleagues argue that because the de-
sign of these studies did not vary the available evidence for different 
charges of guilt, even though the law often requires additional evi-
dence to prove more serious charges than less serious ones, jurors 
were essentially forced to vote not guilty for the more serious 
charges.115 In their own research, Freedman et al. equated the evi-
dence required for guilt for all charges and found no indication that 
mock jurors were less likely to vote guilty when penalties were rela-
tively severe.116 Thus, the extent to which penalty severity can serve 
as a useful analog for consequentiality is unclear.117 
 The underlying premise of this line of research is that the rela-
tionship between no consequence and some consequence is the same 
as the relationship between a small consequence and a large conse-
quence. Is this a reasonable analogy? If so, then the difference be-
tween no jail time and six months imprisonment should be the same 
                                                                                                                    
 112. Norbert L. Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penalty and Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1431, 1431-32 (1978). 
 113. Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Percep-
tions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211, 211 (1972). 
 114. See, e.g., Kalman J. Kaplan & Roger I. Simon, Latitude and Severity of Sentencing 
Options, Race of the Victim and Decisions of Simulated Jurors: Some Issues Arising from 
the “Algiers Motel” Trial, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 87, 90, 96 (1972). 
 115. Jonathan L. Freedman et al., Severity of Penalty, Seriousness of the Charge, and 
Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189, 191 (1994). 
 116. Id. at 189.  
 117. In response to the Freedman et al. study, Kaplan criticized the research for, 
among other reasons, failing to address the consequences of conviction for the defendant or 
society. Martin F. Kaplan, Setting the Record Straight (Again) on Severity of Penalty: A 
Comment on Freedman et al., 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 697, 697 (1994). Further, Kaplan ar-
gued that rather than negate the effect of penalties, the research findings as a whole set 
limits on the penalty-severity effect and support the possibility of a criterion shift due to 
penalty. See id. at 698. The crucial variable, according to Kaplan, is whether the jurors be-
lieve the decision involves real consequences. See id. For a continuation of this debate, see 
Jonathan L. Freedman, Penalties and Verdicts: Keeping the Record Straight, 18 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 699 (1994), and Martin F. Kaplan, Keeping the Record Complete, 18 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 702 (1994). 
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as the difference between six and twelve months imprisonment.118 Al-
though that pattern might correspond well to people’s perceptions, it 
is also possible that there is a discontinuity between no penalty and 
any penalty, in much the same way that there is a discontinuity be-
tween a lengthy prison term and the death penalty.119 
B.   Other Domains 
 The debate over the use of hypothetical situations to study hu-
man decisionmaking is not limited to the legal domain. It is a 
widely accepted practice to use hypothetical situations when in-
vestigating judgment and decisionmaking in a variety of con-
texts.120 As with jury decisionmaking, researchers in these fields 
have occasionally (though also surprisingly seldom) considered the 
difference between decisions made with hypothetical versus real 
consequences.121 
 One research area in particular that has found a need for the 
use of hypothetical situations is the domain of risk-taking behav-
ior. A common approach in this area is to study how people be-
have when faced with a risky situation, such as a hypothetical 
gamble, that can be framed in a number of different ways. Be-
cause of the dependency on hypothetical situations in this re-
search, its validity has often been questioned, which has led to 
research comparing real and hypothetical decisionmakers.122 
Mirroring the inconsistent findings on consequentiality in the 
jury simulation literature, this research has found that people 
make riskier decisions when real consequences are used,123 
                                                                                                                    
 118. The analogy holds even if length of imprisonment is perceived as a nonlinear scale. 
 119. Another way of expressing it is that the extreme alternatives—no consequences at 
all at one end of the continuum and capital punishment at the other end—are qualitatively 
different from the range of alternatives, such as prison sentences of varying duration, that 
comprise the large middle of the continuum. If so, then comparing some-penalty versus no-
penalty involves comparing apples and oranges, whereas comparing more versus less se-
vere penalties involves comparing apples of different sizes. 
 120. For a general overview of research on judgment and decisionmaking, see JONATHAN 
BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (3d ed. 2000). A sizable literature has developed on the ap-
plications of behavioral-decision theory to law. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Eco-
nomics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal 
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: 
A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000). 
 121. See, e.g., Hertwig & Ortmann, supra note 2, at 419-20. The examples in the follow-
ing discussion are not intended to provide an exhaustive review of fields that have raised 
the consequentiality issue. For other domains, see, for example, Eva E.A. Skoe et al., The 
Role of Reported Emotion in Real-Life and Hypothetical Moral Dilemmas, 28 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 962, 964 (2002). 
 122. For examples of the literature, see Hertwig & Ortmann, supra note 2; and Küh-
berger et al., supra note 7. 
 123. See David B. Wiseman & Irwin P. Levin, Comparing Risky Decision Making Un-
der Conditions of Real and Hypothetical Consequences, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 241 (1996). 
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when hypothetical consequences are used,124 and that risk-taking is 
not affected at all by a consequentiality manipulation.125 In particu-
lar, in the area of Expected Utility Theory, the issue remains 
whether providing people with actual rather than imagined incen-
tives would eliminate routinely observed behaviors showing that 
people fail to maximize the expected utility of their decisions. For ex-
ample, research on framing effects assumes that the use of hypo-
thetical situations adequately measures what decisions would be like 
in actual situations. The classic framing task asks people to imagine, 
for instance, that a disease is expected to kill 600 people.126 One 
group is then asked to decide between two positively framed choices: 
either saving 200 people for sure or taking a one-in-three chance of 
saving all 600.127 Another group chooses between negatively framed 
choices: either 400 people dying for sure or a two-in-three chance of 
all 600 dying.128 In the positive-frame condition, people tend to prefer 
the first (sure) choice over the latter (risky) option, whereas in the 
negative-frame condition, people tend to choose the risky option over 
the sure choice.129  
 Does this effect hold true when real consequences are at stake? 
Wiseman and Levin varied risks between framed monetary gambles 
and time investments that were presented first as a hypothetical de-
cision, then later as a real decision.130 The results indicated no sig-
nificant differences in participants’ decision behavior between real 
and hypothetical situations;131 but because the hypothetical choices 
preceded the real choices, the findings may simply be due to carry-
over effects, where participants might have just tried to appear con-
sistent in their choices.132  
 Kühberger et al. also note that most experiments contrasting real 
and hypothetical outcomes suffer from a lack of nontrivial real out-
comes and that the framing effect may disappear when real and hy-
                                                                                                                    
 124. See Terence Lafferty & Kenneth L. Higbee, Realism and Risk Taking, 34 
PSYCHOL. REP. 827, 827-29 (1974); Paul Slovic, Differential Effects of Real Versus Hypo-
thetical Payoffs on Choices Among Gambles, 80 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 434, 434 
(1969). 
 125. See Julie R. Irwin et al., Hypothetical and Real Consequences in Experimental 
Auctions for Insurance Against Low-Probability Risks, 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 107 
(1992); Paul E. Spector et al., The Effects of Real vs. Hypothetical Risk on Group Choice-
Shifts, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 290 (1976). This variability of empirical 
findings could reflect the wide range of experimental methodologies used in psychological 
research on judgment and decisionmaking. Hertwig & Ortmann, supra note 2. 
 126. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology 
of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Wiseman & Levin, supra note 123. 
 131. Id. at 248-49.  
 132. Kühberger et al., supra note 7, at 1166. 
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pothetical decisions with small and large payoffs are compared.133 To 
test this possibility, they assigned participants to either a positive or 
a negative framing condition; the participants then made both hypo-
thetical and real decisions with both small and large payoffs. They 
found that the payoff size had a significant effect, such that partici-
pants more often chose the sure option when payoffs were large 
rather than small.134 They also found the expected framing-by-payoff-
size interaction—with small payoffs, there was no framing effect, but 
with large payoffs, the typical framing effect appeared.135 Of greatest 
relevance to the present discussion, there were no observed effects 
for real versus hypothetical payoffs.136 In sum, Kühberger et al. found 
that when people are presented with an actual risk-decision task, 
their decisions are similar to when they are presented with a hypo-
thetical risk-decision task: risks are taken with small payoffs regard-
less of frame and with large payoffs when negatively framed.  
 So what does this mean for jury simulations? On their face, the 
results of the Kühberger et al. study give some hope for the use of 
jury simulation studies, in that the decision process appeared not to 
depend on whether the decision task was real or hypothetical.137 
However, there are several fundamental differences between the two 
tasks that make the application of the results not as widely applica-
ble as one might hope. First, there is the nature of the task. Unlike 
the risk-decision studies where participants are asked to make a de-
cision between similar monetary gambles that result in statistically 
equal outcomes, juries are given the task of weighing evidence and 
deciding facts in arriving at a well-reasoned decision with quite di-
vergent alternative outcomes. Secondly, although there are conse-
quences involved in juror decisionmaking for the jurors themselves, 
the principal consequences are for the litigants in the case;138 
whereas the consequences involved in making decisions about risk or 
gambles will primarily (and sometimes exclusively) affect the person 
                                                                                                                    
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1169-70.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 1169. There were also no interactions between consequentiality and the 
other variables. 
 137. In a more extensive review of the literature, Hertwig and Ortmann reached a dif-
ferent conclusion, finding that although real consequences in the form of actual payments 
“do not guarantee optimal decisions, in many cases they bring decisions closer to the pre-
dictions of the normative models.” Hertwig & Ortmann, supra note 2, at 395. However, 
they noted the considerable variability in the effects of consequentiality across various de-
cisionmaking contexts. Id. at 395-96. They also excluded from consideration studies in 
which there was no clear standard for optimal performance; whereas in jury trials, the op-
timal or “correct” outcome is typically unknown. See id. See generally Colin F. Camerer & 
Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capi-
tal-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1999). 
 138. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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making the decision. This distinction could induce different decision 
processes in the two types of situations.  
V.   ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Is the enterprise of studying juries through experiments absurd? 
In light of the concerns presented here, are we (that is, experimental 
jury researchers) wasting our time and efforts? As with virtually all 
literature reviews, this one concludes that more research is needed 
on real versus hypothetical jury decisions. We found only five direct 
comparisons in the jury domain, and these studies produced inconsis-
tent findings. The question has been addressed to some extent in 
other areas of research, such as the broader decisionmaking litera-
ture, yet without shedding much light on the differences between 
real and simulated decisionmaking in terms of either decision proc-
ess or outcome. In designing such research, future scholars should 
carefully consider whether consequentiality matters from a legal or a 
theoretical perspective. 
 Most courts have demonstrated a clear reluctance to base legal 
holdings on experimental research findings. Therefore, if psycholegal 
researchers wish to produce legally relevant research, it seems im-
perative that they (that is, we) determine whether, and how, conse-
quentiality affects juror decisions.139 The corpus of studies is as yet 
insufficient to reach any definitive conclusions. Adding to this corpus 
is complicated, however, by the numerous practical difficulties de-
scribed in Part III of this Article. What alternatives then exist? 
 One alternative is to conduct research that, while not manipulat-
ing consequentiality directly, manipulates variables analogous to 
consequentiality. This is the approach taken in the research on pen-
alty severity.140 Because of the difficulties inherent in experimentally 
manipulating the consequences for the litigants, another approach 
would be to manipulate the consequences for the mock jurors. As de-
scribed above, the notion of consequentiality subsumes the jurors as 
well as the litigants. One could vary the consequences for the mock 
jurors by, for example, varying their task motivation (perhaps by of-
fering some sort of reward for good performance, such as a financial 
incentive)141 or accountability for their decision.142 If such variables 
                                                                                                                    
 139. This is by no means to suggest that psycholegal research must have legal applica-
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 140. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text. 
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affect either the process or the outcome of mock jurors’ decisions, 
then we need to be cautious about generalizing from mock jurors to 
real jurors. 
 Another alternative is to conduct experimentation on real juries in 
field settings. From a scientific perspective, there are trade-offs in 
conducting field research in lieu of experimental research. Most 
prominently, field research sacrifices experimental control, which is 
essential for making causal inferences, and it is usually more diffi-
cult and expensive to conduct.143 Doing field research on juries carries 
the additional complication that, with isolated exceptions,144 it is ille-
gal to observe juries during deliberation; and even if deliberation is 
not of primary interest, it still requires, at a minimum, the approval 
of the participating judges.  
 Nonetheless, jury researchers have occasionally succeeded at con-
ducting field studies. Professors Heuer and Penrod conducted several 
field studies on the effects of procedural innovations such as allowing 
jurors to ask questions and take notes;145 more recently, the Arizona 
Jury Project addressed these and similar questions.146 In both cases, 
participating judges allowed juries to be randomly assigned to differ-
ent experimental conditions. Both projects have led to policy changes 
being adopted by the courts.147 Calls for more field experiments on ju-
ries have been issued from prominent psychological and legal schol-
ars.148 Because of the high external validity of field studies, their 
findings are harder for courts to dismiss on methodological 
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grounds.149 As the field of jury research continues to mature, we hope 
to see more of them. 
                                                                                                                    
 149. Unless, of course, the increased external validity comes, as it sometimes does, at 
the cost of decreased internal validity, in which case the field studies could simply be dis-
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